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The Royal Navy and Sea Power in British Strategy, 1945-55 
Tim Benbow 
 
It might be thought that the importance of sea power and the Royal Navy in British strategy 
would be a given.1  As an island power that has long played a notable role in international 
affairs on its neighbouring continent and also further overseas, any consideration of how 
Britain uses military means to support its policy goals in peacetime and in war (the definition 
of strategy used herein) must surely start from the premise that use of the sea is essential and 
that naval power is therefore a central pillar.  Clearly, the precise role and priority accorded to 
the Navy fluctuates according to the context of the time: the acceptance of a continental 
commitment before the First World War and the focus on strategic bombing in the 1930s, for 
example, both saw the Navy take second place to other concerns.  Even during the intense 
debates of the first half of the 20th century, however, the need for Britain to have a powerful 
fleet equivalent to if not greater than the other leading navies, was hardly disputed.  Even 
second place still acknowledged that sea power was of vital importance to Britain, albeit not 
enjoying the preeminent position it had held in previous centuries.  The continuing centrality 
of naval power should have been all the more evident in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, in which it was one of the principal pillars of British and indeed Allied strategy.2 
Yet during the period immediately following the end of the war, the place of sea 
power in British strategy was seriously questioned and the very survival of the Royal Navy as 
a significant actor came under sustained attack.  In contrast to the usual pattern of 
bureaucratic compromise and broadly balanced forces, the ten years after the war saw a 
growing assault on the role of the Navy and its core capabilities.  General scepticism about 
the likelihood of major war or the existence of a naval threat from the Soviet Union, together 
with comfortable assumptions about the naval power of the United States, created some 
initial doubts about the importance of the Navy for Britain at a time of severe economic 
strain.  These sentiments coalesced with wild theories about the impact of nuclear weapons 
and resurrected claims regarding the potential of land-based air power.  Supported by 
powerful institutional interests that sought to prioritise air power or simply to save money, 
these attacks culminated in a campaign that amounted to an existential threat to the role of the 
Royal Navy in British strategy.  Yet in the face of this coordinated onslaught, the Admiralty 
held its course, setting out the continuing need to defend sea communications and making the 
case for naval aviation, which was the principal target of its critics.  It advanced a case that 
was sufficiently convincing to win over enough of the key decision-makers, and to outlast 
some of the irreconcilables, such that the Navy successfully weathered the storm.  The 
‘decline’ theme is a little tired and lacking in nuance as a description of the postwar fate of 
the Royal Navy.  As this paper argues, however, had the debates of the early 1950s taken a 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank Christopher Bell, James Goldrick, Edward Hampshire, John Hattendorf, Greg 
Kennedy, George Peden and Geoffrey Till for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
2 One recent work suggests that naval power (alongside air power) was even more significant than is generally 
conceded; O’Brien, P.P., How the War was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 
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different turn, the chapter title used in one declinist work, ‘The end of the road: British sea 
power in the postwar world’, might have been amply justified.3   
This paper considers the evolving role of the Royal Navy in Britain’s strategy during 
the ten years following the end of the Second World War.  The general literature on British 
defence policy since 1945 tends to devote little attention to naval matters, in particular to 
those in the early 1950s despite these providing a number of the principal controversies of the 
period.  Where they do touch specifically on naval issues, these tend to be the inter-service 
disputes of the mid-1960s or even the early 1980s, overlooking their context in the form of 
the earlier arguments that were equally bitter and perhaps of even higher stakes for the Navy.4  
Among works specifically on the Royal Navy, its development in the 1950s has not received 
the attention it deserves.  This is perhaps in part because much of the literature either does not 
make use of archival sources or appeared at a time when many of the relevant papers 
(especially those relating to nuclear strategy) were initially withheld and not released to the 
National Archives under the 30-year rule.5  While several of these works provide valuable 
context,6 the result is that the magnitude and the gravity of the challenges to the Navy and the 
aircraft carriers that were its core capability have not been fully appreciated.  This paper 
therefore adds to the existing literature by examining a subject that has not previously been 
covered in depth, drawing on some previously unused archival sources. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Kennedy, P., The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery – Third Edition (London: Fontana, 1991), chapter 12. 
4 For general works on British defence policy, see Bartlett, C.J., The Long Retreat: A Short History of British 
Defence Policy 1945-70 (London: Macmillan, 1972); Baylis, J., British Defence Policy in a Changing World 
(London: Croom Helm, 1977); Carver, M., Tightrope Walking: British Defence Policy Since 1945 (London: 
Hutchinson, 1992); Croft, S. et al., Britain and Defence 1945-2000 – A Policy Re-evaluation (Harlow: 
Longman, 2000); Darby, P., British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947-68 (London: OUP, 1973); Dockrill, M., 
British Defence Since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1988); Gregory, F. et al. (eds.)  Perspectives upon British 
Defence Policy, 1945-1970 (Southampton: University of Southampton, 1978); Martin, L.W., British Defence 
Policy: the Long Recessional (London: IISS, 1969); Ovendale, R., British Defence Policy Since 1945 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994); Peden, G.C., Arms, Economics and British Strategy: From 
Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs (Cambridge: CUP, 2007); Rosecrance, R.N., Defense of the Realm: British 
Strategy in the Nuclear Epoch (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); Self, R., British Foreign and 
Defence Policy Since 1945 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Snyder, W.P., The Politics of British 
Defense Policy 1945-62 (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1964). 
5 The best overview of the Royal Navy in the postwar period is Grove, E.J, Vanguard to Trident: British Naval 
Policy Since World War II (London: Bodley Head, 1987), although it was written before several key sources 
were released.  Other works draw on little or no archival material; see Arthur, M., The Navy: 1939 to the 
Present Day (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1997); Crowe, W. J., The Policy Roots of the Modern Royal Navy, 
1946-63 (Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, 1965); Garbutt, P.E., Naval Challenge 1945-1961 (London: 
MacDonald, 1961); Hampshire, A.C., The Royal Navy Since 1945 (London: Purnell, 1975); Humble, R., The 
Rise and Fall of the British Navy (London: Queen Anne Press, 1986); Redford, D. and Grove, P. The Royal 
Navy: A History Since 1900 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2014); Tute, W., The True Glory: The Story of the Royal 
Navy over a Thousand Years (London: MacDonald, 1983); Wettern, D., The Decline of British Sea Power 
(London: Janes, 1982); Van Der Vat, D., Standard of Power: The Royal Navy in the Twentieth Century 
(London: Pimlico, 2001). 
6 Particularly Grove, Vanguard to Trident; also Moore, R., The Royal Navy and Nuclear Weapons (London: 
Frank Cass, 2001), Baylis, J., Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy 1945-1964 (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1995). 
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Early developments, 1945-1947 
The context for post-war British strategy was distinctly challenging.7  There were the usual 
problems of a transition from major war to peace, primarily demobilisation of both the armed 
forces and the wartime economy.  However, in contrast to the aftermath of earlier great 
power wars, such as in 1918 or 1815, there was no period of even relative peace and stability 
in which to recuperate.  Over the final months of the war London had come to view its Soviet 
ally with increasing suspicion and lingering hopes of postwar partnership swiftly gave way to 
the onset of cold war.  The victory of the Labour Party in the May 1945 election brought to 
power a government that was determined to increase the proportion of national wealth 
devoted to social services and health.  Yet there was no intention to undertake any radical 
change in direction as regards foreign policy, with Britain’s remaining global commitments 
to be upheld.  This aspiration was seriously complicated by the huge recent advances in 
military technology, which needed to be assessed and developed if the armed forces were to 
remain at the front rank of military power.  This would not come cheaply but the country’s 
serious and worsening economic problems meant that defence spending was bound to come 
under severe pressure.  The longer term result of these factors was a continuous crisis in 
defence policy, with demands to reduce defence spending never quite being matched by 
reductions in the calls on the armed forces. 
Despite the dizzying pace of recent technological development, the Admiralty 
anticipated that the postwar roles of the Navy would remain broadly familiar.  In peacetime, 
they were, first, to ‘keep the peace and support British policy’, and second, to ensure 
readiness for war and the strength to deter any aggressor.  In war, the Navy would have to 
destroy enemy sea and air forces, defend imperial sea communications, attack enemy sea 
communications and cooperate with the other services in amphibious operations.  The fleet 
should therefore include ‘Fighting units to counter the enemy’s heavy surface forces’, 
including ‘a proper proportion’ of battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers; escort 
squadrons to protect shipping; shore-based aircraft; minesweeping forces; fast submarines, 
minelayers and coastal craft to attack enemy shipping; forces for amphibious operations; 
bases, shore organisation and afloat support.  All of these elements were needed: ‘None has 
yet been rendered obsolete by scientific development, though their characteristics and relative 
numbers will undoubtedly change as new weapons and tactics are evolved.’8 
The impact of nuclear weapons on the Navy was intensively studied within the 
Admiralty, with a wide range of tentative conclusions being drawn.9  On the one hand, the 
future could be stark, with the possibility that attacks on ports rather than shipping could end 
the Navy’s role of protecting sea communications, or that attacks on industry and civilians 
might decide the war before the Navy could mobilise.  In the event of nuclear war, it was 
                                                 
7 For the foreign policy context, see Barnett, C., Lost Victory: British Dreams, British Realities, 1945-1950 
(London: Macmillan, 1995); Bullock, A., Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951 (London: Heinemann, 
1983); Reynolds, D., Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the 20th Century (London: 
Longman, 1991). 
8 Admiralty Plans Division, ‘The Post War Navy and the Policy Governing its Composition’, 17 July 1945, The 
National Archives, Kew: ADM167/123.  All primary sources are from the National Archives unless stated. 
9 For a useful overview, see Moore, Royal Navy and Nuclear Weapons, pp.39-59. 
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likely that, ‘no fleet of surface ships could remain afloat within the sphere of action of land-
based aircraft carrying atomic bombs’.  Alternatively, the growing vulnerability of aircraft to 
air defences could hand the Navy the task of delivering nuclear weapons, ‘by rockets 
launched from specialised vessels, either surface or, even better, submersible’.  Moreover, 
general war was not the only possibility, as the threat of retaliation could deter the use of 
nuclear weapons just as it had with poison gas; there would still be conflicts between lesser 
powers in which Britain could be involved or threats to British territory, ‘in which a more or 
less normal Navy would play its usual part’.10  Hence, although the impact of nuclear 
weapons remained uncertain, potential roles remained for the Navy in limited wars, in 
delivering nuclear weapons or even in conventional operations during a nuclear war.  The 
assumption that sea power retained a key role even in nuclear war was not confined to the 
Admiralty: a 1946 committee chaired by Sir Henry Tizard (the government’s chief scientific 
advisor) examined these questions, concluding that whilst atomic weapons would have a 
decisive role, the significance of the war at sea was in no way diminished: ‘The defence of 
sea communications, and the strength of the Royal Navy, reinforced, but not replaced by 
aircraft will remain the supreme necessity.’11 
The principal obstacle confronting the Admiralty in this early period was not a 
general rejection of the role of sea power in future war but rather a widely held view that, 
despite the increasing hostility of the USSR, it posed little naval threat.  Scepticism on this 
front went right to the top with Clement Attlee, the Prime Minister, questioning why 
Admiralty plans envisaged 182,000 men whereas in 1938, when it had faced the German, 
Italian and Japanese fleets, the Navy had 119,000.12  This feeling was, unsurprisingly, shared 
in the Treasury, where one senior official questioned whether the Defence Committee would 
approve the Admiralty’s plans for the Fleet Air Arm, ‘in face of the fact that we have no 
naval aggressor to consider’.13  In response, the Admiralty argued that a significant Soviet 
threat could not be ruled out, not least due to vessels captured from Germany, while A.V. 
Alexander, the First Lord of the Admiralty (subsequently, from December 1946, Minister of 
Defence),14 told the Cabinet that ‘it was clear that the Soviet Government were seeking to 
build up a powerful Navy’.  It also pointed out that the pre-war British fleet to which the 
Prime Minister referred had been gravely inadequate for the threats it faced – not least 
because defending sea communications required far more resources than attacking them.  
Further, it argued that the strength of the Navy depended on its assigned tasks rather than 
relating only to the strength of the most likely enemy, and pointed to the wider utility of the 
Navy as the most mobile British force available as a deterrent or a ‘steadying influence’ 
anywhere in the world.15  The evident growth of Soviet naval capability soon spiked the guns 
                                                 
10 See papers in ADM1/17259, especially memoranda by ACNS(W), 15 August 1945; DNOR, 4 September 
1945; and DTSD, 11 October 1945. 
11 DO(46)89, ‘Future Developments in Weapons and Methods of War’, 8 July 1946, CAB131/3. 
12 Minute M195/46, 4 June 1946, Annex I, DO(46)97, CAB131/3. 
13 Blunt to Sir Bernard Gilbert, 11 July 1946, T225/1101. 
14 Howell, D., ‘Alexander, Albert Victor, Earl Alexander of Hillsborough (1885–1965)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography (Oxford: OUP, 2004) – hereafter DNB. 
15 Prime Minister, CP(46)65, ‘Defence Policy in 1946’, 15 February 1946, CAB129/7; DO(46)5 th Conclusions, 
15 February 1946, CAB131/1; CM(46)16th Conclusions, 18 February 1946, CAB128/5; First Lord to Prime 
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of the sceptics.  When Hugh Dalton (Chancellor of the Exchequer) again noted that the 
German, Italian and Japanese fleets no longer existed and ‘no one claims that the Russians 
have, as yet, a fleet as strong as any one of these in 1938’, he was corrected by Admiral Sir 
John Cunningham, the First Sea Lord, who informed him that whilst Germany had had 65 
submarines on the outbreak of war, the Russians currently had 230 in service, alongside 17 
cruisers and 69 destroyers, many of which were new.16 
While the growing threat at sea was becoming harder to ignore, the actual strength of 
the Navy could only be determined in the context of the needs of the other services – and 
within the limits of the overall defence budget.  The key question here was the likely pattern 
of a future war.  The broad expectation in 1946 and 1947 was that in the event of war there 
would be no way to prevent the USSR, with its enormous superiority in land forces, from 
rapidly overrunning Western Europe.  British strategy would therefore rest on withdrawing 
from Europe and relying for victory on atomic air attacks on the Soviet Union.  Therein lay a 
serious dilemma for Britain: Soviet military superiority meant that the West would have to 
use nuclear weapons since conventional air power alone would be inadequate.  Yet their use 
would bring down nuclear retaliation on the UK.  With its ‘dense and concentrated 
population and industries’, even a small number of nuclear weapons could inflict such great 
damage ‘that the area might become useless as an offensive air base and the country might 
never recover’.17  Britain could not win without nuclear weapons yet nor could she survive a 
war in which they were used.  The result was a growing emphasis on deterring rather than 
fighting war.  However, the hope in some quarters that this could lead to a cheap defence 
policy were swiftly dashed as it became clear that nuclear weapons would not be sufficient on 
their own.  Britain would need to defend air bases for the counter-offensive in the UK and the 
Middle East and would therefore need conventional forces to defend both, as well as the sea 
communications connecting them.18 
This strategy envisaged a significant role for naval forces, which would be needed to 
control communications in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean for access to sources of 
supply, supporting the deployment of air forces, and denying use of the sea to the enemy.19  
This was no minor task: ‘by 1956 the threat to sea communications would also be greater 
than in the Second World War’.  The principal threats at sea would be fast submarines, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Minister, DO(46)97, 24 July 1946, CAB131/3.  A later paper added that the pre-war figure did not include naval 
aviation, which was then provided by the RAF, accounting for 55,000 additional personnel. 
16 DO(47)9, Chancellor of the Exchequer, ‘Defence Estimates for 1947-48’, 13 January 1947, CAB131/4;  
DO(47)2nd Conclusions, 14 January 1947, CAB131/5.  By September 1950, according to the Joint Intelligence 
Committee, the Soviet Navy had in service 17 cruisers, 133 destroyers, 181 ocean-going submarines and 130 
coastal submarines; their naval air force alone had 2,980 aircraft.  DO(50)101, ‘Military and Economic Strength 
of the Soviet Union, JIC(50)83(Final)’, 18 September 1950, CAB131/9.  These figures cast doubt on comments 
such as that by Jackson and Bramall that in 1950, ‘there was no evidence of the Soviet naval expansion which 
was to start in earnest in the 1960s’; they later accept that by 1953 that the growth of the Soviet fleet helped to 
make the case for the Navy.  Jackson, W. and Bramall, D., The Chiefs: The Story of the United Kingdom Chiefs 
of Staff (London: Brasseys, 1992), pp.279, 287. 
17 JP(47)55(Final), ‘Future Defence Policy’, 7 May 1947, DEFE6/2;  JP(48)59(Final), ‘Overall Strategic 
Concept for War in 1957’, 16 September 1948, DEFE4/16. 
18 DO(47)44, Chiefs of Staff, ‘Future Defence Policy’, 22 May 1947, CAB131/4; also JP(47)129 (Final), ‘Shape 
and Size of the Armed Forces’, 11 November 1947, DEFE6/3. 
19 DO(48)61, Report by Chiefs of Staff, ‘Defence Review’, 14 September 1948, CAB131/6. 
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aircraft and mines, but ‘the threat of surface attacks on our shipping must still be guarded 
against’, while to ensure the defence of the Middle East and India, ‘Naval forces capable of 
giving all necessary support to the Army’s land battle will be required’.20   Thus, the deterrent 
to war would comprise not only nuclear weapons but also conventional forces to defend the 
‘three pillars’ – the UK, sea communications and the Middle East.  Nuclear air power would 
not provide a low-cost means to cut through the Gordian Knot facing British defence policy-
makers. 
Yet the forces required by this strategy were well beyond what was feasible.  When 
the Minister of Defence explicitly asked the Admiralty in July 1947 what forces would be 
required on the outbreak of war, the response listed eight battleships, ten fleet carriers, 21 
light fleet carriers and 30 cruisers as well as numerous escorts and submarines.21  This 
theoretical force structure, just like those of the other two services, was quite outside the 
realms of plausibility.  The government therefore imposed a series of political assumptions to 
serve as the basis for planning.  The most significant of these was that ‘the probability of war 
in the next five years is negligible’; the Minister of Defence specified a budget ceiling of 
£600m and asked the Chiefs of Staff what could be afforded under it and what risks would be 
involved.22  Perhaps predictably, the resulting papers from the service departments entailed 
defence spending of £900m.  The Minister bluntly informed the Chiefs that ‘it is not possible 
to contemplate a major war until our economic and industrial strength has recovered’, so the 
£600m limit must be accepted.  He reiterated the political assumptions that the government 
was imposing: it ‘must be accepted that the risk of a major war is ruled out during the next 
five years, and that the risk will increase only gradually during the following five years... If 
attacked, we must fight with what we have’.  Since the country could not afford all the forces 
seen as necessary on the outbreak of war, it would have to ‘build up only the forces which 
give us the best chance of survival’, which, of course, left ample room for interpretation and 
argument.  The priority should be ‘forces which in peace give the best visible show of 
strength and therefore have the greatest deterrent value’ as well as research and development 
for the future.23 
For the Navy, this implied the postponement of new construction in favour of 
modernizing the existing fleet.  Delaying new warships offered short-term attractions in terms 
of balancing the budget but had the significant downside of storing up problems for the 
future.  Promised warships and equipment programmes were delayed and when the ‘jam 
tomorrow’ became due, there were always other pressures and priorities.  The Navy was (and 
has often proved to be) particularly vulnerable to seeing its force structure eroded as a result 
of short-term financial pressures, not least due to the high capital cost of major units making 
                                                 
20 DO(47)44. 
21 Board Minute 4171, ADM167/128; Memorandum B520, ‘Future Defence Policy – Naval Peacetime 
Requirements’, 26 July 1947, ADM167/129. 
22 COS(47)114(O), Minister of Defence, ‘Future Defence Policy’, 30 May 1947, DEFE5/4. 
23 COS(47)173(O), Minister of Defence, ‘Future Defence Policy – Strength of the Armed Forces’, 23 August 
1947, DEFE5/5. 
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them an easy target to produce quick savings.  This was only one of the problems emanating 
from what amounted to a new version of the infamous ‘ten-year rule’ of the interwar period.24 
In 1947, the forces envisaged were broadly feasible, even if not wholly meeting the 
requirements of the services and at a cost higher than Dalton, the Chancellor, wished.25  The 
Navy would need ‘strong and up-to-date anti-submarine forces’, with ‘the backing of surface 
forces, including shipborne aircraft’, and the RAF would need fighters as well as bombers.  A 
large regular Army, however, would be ‘neither necessary nor within our means to sustain’, 
so there should be a small, well-equipped, highly trained regular Army, backed by a reserve 
force.26  Alexander concluded that the accepted priorities meant that the forces could not be 
treated equally: ‘Put crudely, my view is that proportionately most of our eggs must go into 
the baskets of research and development, the Air Force (especially on the deterrent side) and 
the Navy (primarily on Naval Aviation and protection of communications)’. 
What kept the force structure within the realms of plausibility was, first, the 
assumption that war could be ruled out for five to ten years and, second, the fact that the 
adopted strategy did not require a large army.  Should either of these two assumptions be 
challenged, the problems for British defence policy would intensify.  In fact, both were soon 
overtaken by events. 
The problem compounded 
The first additional strain was a reassessment of the size of the army that Britain needed.  In 
early 1948, Field Marshal Montgomery, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, floated the idea 
that the defence of the UK required any Russian attack to be held as far east as possible, 
preferably on the Rhine, and stressed that Britain would need to commit substantial land 
forces.  Doing so would provide some defence in depth against Soviet air and missile attack 
on the UK, which could otherwise defeat it even without the use of atomic weapons.27  Lord 
Tedder, Chief of the Air Staff, drew attention to the financial implications of the proposal and 
warned: ‘If a Continental policy was now to be adopted, the future shape and size of the 
armed forces would need to be recast.’  Admiral Sir John Cunningham, First Sea Lord, 
pointed out that traditional British policy was to refrain from land operations at the outset of a 
war and use maritime power, to which air power had now been added; undertaking land 
                                                 
24 The postwar ‘five plus five’ version did lack the most damaging feature of the interwar ten-year rule, that it 
rolled forward each year; at least the new period was fixed to 1957.  Jackson and Bramall, The Chiefs, p.271; 
Grove, E.J., ‘The Post War “Ten Year Rule” – Myth and Reality’, RUSI Journal, Vol.129 No.4 (December 
1984).  Nevertheless, it still had harmful effects.  The secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee suggested that 
this relaxed view of the potential Soviet threat impeded strategy making: ‘until recently any planning on a long 
term basis was handicapped by the general conception that war (from 1947) was unlikely during the next five 
years.  Even reference in highly secret official papers to a potential enemy was frowned upon.’  Note by General 
Hollis, ‘Shape and Size of the Armed Forces’, 8 October 1948, CAB21/1862. 
25 Dalton wanted greater reductions in military spending and was frustrated that the Prime Minister, Foreign 
Secretary and Minister of Defence all opposed this; Dalton, H., High Tide and After, Memoirs 1945-1960 
(London: Frederick Muller, 1962), pp.193-202; Pimlott, B. (ed.), The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1918-40, 
1945-60 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), pp.405-07, 414-15; Dell, E., The Chancellors: A History of the 
Chancellors of the Exchequer 1945-1990 (London: HarperCollins, 1997), pp.68-70. 
26 COS(47)33(O), Minister of Defence, 18 February 1947, DEFE5/3. 
27 COS(48)26(O), Chief of the Imperial General Staff, ‘The Problem of Future War and the Strategy of War 
with Russia’, 30 January 1948, DEFE5/10. 
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operations would reduce British sea and air power.  Montgomery in turn insisted that it would 
be disastrous to allow the USSR to overrun Western Europe, whereas defending the Rhine 
would facilitate both the air defence of the UK and the defence of sea communications.28  
While there was undeniable military logic to his argument, such a new commitment would 
increase the already grave strain on the budget; put simply, ‘we shall certainly not be able to 
afford a deterrent air force, an adequate navy and a continental army.’29  The government was 
not ready to accept Montgomery’s costly proposal but developments in world politics soon 
precipitated a rethink. 
The international situation deteriorated so sharply during 1948 that Attlee warned it 
might become necessary to reconsider the assumption that the risk of war would be low 
before 1952, then rising gradually until 1957.30  The coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin 
blockade fostered the impression that there could be a war ‘in the near future’, and the British 
forces were unprepared and needed urgent remedial measures.31  The same year saw the 
beginning of the Malayan Emergency, which became a long and heavy military commitment.  
Growing international tension resulted in Britain taking a prominent role in the Brussels Pact, 
leading to the Western European Union (March 1948) and then NATO (April 1949).32  
Whilst the creation of these alliances represented a triumph for British diplomacy, they 
entailed expensive new pledges to maintain land and air forces in West Germany.  British 
responsibilities in a war with Russia were described, in order of priority, as: defence of the 
UK; control of essential sea communications in the Atlantic and Mediterranean; defence of 
the Middle East base; preparation of bases for US Strategic Air Forces; and fighting on the 
continent of Europe.33  The last had not even been mentioned in January 1947. 
The principal challenge for defence policy was to devise a force structure that could 
achieve the ambitious aims set by the government, within a budget that was affordable for an 
economy in a state of perpetual crisis.  A series of attempts to square this circle made only 
limited progress.  In 1949 the government established an ‘Inter-Service Working Party on the 
Shape and Size of the Armed Forces’, referred to as the Harwood Committee after the civil 
servant who chaired it.34  It based its study on fairly benign assumptions, not only the still 
extant view that there would be no war for five years and then only a rising risk thereafter, 
but also that there would be no less than 18 months warning before any war, and that it would 
see significant American forces engaged from the outset (a case of third time lucky?).  The 
                                                 
28 COS(48)16th, 2 February 1948 and COS(48)18th, 4 February 1948, DEFE4/10; see also Ovendale, British 
Defence Policy, pp.46-48; Baylis, J., British Defence Policy: Striking the Right Balance (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1989), pp.20-23.  Jackson and Bramall comment, ‘At no period before or since has there been such 
bitterness and animosity in the Chiefs of Staff Committee.’  The Chiefs, pp.271-73. 
29 PUS to Secretary of State for Air, 27 January 1948, AIR8/1587; emphasis original. 
30 CP(48)206, Prime Minister, ‘Preparations for Defence’, 24 August 1948, CAB129/29. 
31 DO(48)49, Chiefs of Staff, ‘Preparations for Defence’, 29 July 1948, CAB131/6.  See also CP(48)7, Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘Review of Soviet Policy’, 6 January 1948, CAB129/23. 
32 For analysis of these and copies of the treaties, see Baylis, J., The Diplomacy of Pragmatism (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1993). 
33 DO(48)53, ‘Preparations for Defence’, 11 August 1948, CAB131/6.  Britain formally committed troops to the 
continent in 1950, though it was not announced until 1954. 
34 Edmund Harwood, drafted in from the Ministry of Food, was undoubtedly neutral but his expertise in defence 
was uncertain; Peden, Arms, Economics and British Strategy, p.248. 
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report sought the best force structure that could be devised within the Treasury-imposed 
budget ceiling for the next three years.  The result, focusing on a war after 1957, was 
swingeing cuts in the armed forces.35   Regarding the Navy, while the Harwood report did 
stress the need to defend sea communications, it made heroic assumptions about the extent to 
which Britain could rely on the Americans to take on roles previously seen as core to the 
Royal Navy.  Those to ‘be performed by allied naval forces or not at all’ included countering 
enemy surface warships, protecting convoys through the Mediterranean, and defending the 
Persian Gulf and the Far East (except Hong Kong).  The report envisaged removing all 
battleships, cutting carriers, halving the number of cruisers and even abolishing the Royal 
Marines; a role remained for naval aviation but it would be increasingly integrated into the 
RAF.36  The main strength of the fleet would be a carrier task force, which would be largely 
confined to eastern Atlantic and UK waters, together with some escorts in the Mediterranean.  
The result would be a carrier and small ship Navy, ‘whose main wartime task would be the 
protection of the United Kingdom and of its approaches and sea communications with North 
America against submarine attack’.37  The Air Ministry embraced the suggestion that Britain 
did not need large warships: ‘The Navy is subjected to the most vigorous cuts of all.  This is 
based on the thesis, which we consider the right one, that America holds such a 
preponderance at sea that our contribution can be reduced to very little in the class of heavy 
ships, and that the Russian effort at sea will be almost exclusively devoted to submarine 
warfare.’38  Their comments overlooked the fact that the report contained a similar judgement 
about the limited need for heavy bombers given the US preponderance in this category.39 
The report satisfied no one.  The Treasury was concerned that it assumed significant 
increases in expenditure after the initial three-year period.  The Chiefs of Staff agreed that the 
conclusions were quite unacceptable – not only would the recommended forces be unable to 
fulfil agreed policy, they would also cost more than the stated ceiling – and treated the report 
as proof that the envisaged budget could not sustain government policy.40  Alexander stated 
starkly: ‘It is not difficult to see that the Harwood proposals as they stand would lead to such 
a catastrophic decline in our influence as would bring very close our extinction as a first rank 
Power.’41  Many of the suggested cuts would eventually come to pass over the following 
decades, with the vision of the future Navy proving remarkably prophetic, but they 
represented too bitter a pill for the government to swallow at this point.  While the Treasury 
was keen to squeeze defence in order to avoid having to reduce spending on social services, 
                                                 
35 DO(49)47, ‘Size and Shape of the Armed Forces: Report of the Harwood Working Party’, 21 June 1949, 
CAB131/7.  Papers relating to the report can be found in DEFE7/592 and 593. 
36 DO(49)47, also ‘Appendix A to Annex VIII – Shape and Size of Navy in 1956-57’. 
37 DO(49)48, ‘The Size and Shape of the Armed Forces: The Harwood Report’, 21 June 1949, CAB131/7. 
38 ‘Notes on Harwood Report’, undated (April 1949), AIR20/11422. 
39 This point did not escape the notice of the Treasury, which described the Air Ministry’s planned bomber force 
as excessive and ‘not consistent with the main strategy under which the responsibility for such air power is left 
to the USA’; ‘Size and Shape of the Armed Forces 1950-53: Specific items on which further savings might be 
made’, 19 November 1949, T225/62. 
40 For the Treasury opinion, see comments of 4 July 1949, T225/62; for the Chiefs’ view, COS(49)77th, 25 May 
1949, DEFE4/22. 
41 DO(49)51, Minister of Defence, ‘Size and Shape of the Armed Forces 1950-53’, 27 June 1949, CAB131/7. 
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the Ministry of Defence received support from the Foreign Office and the Commonwealth 
Affairs Office in moderating the demands of the Chancellor.42 
In September 1949 the Chiefs of Staff set the strategic priorities as first, success in the 
cold war; second, the defence of Britain against air attack; third, the security of sea 
communications; fourth, the retention of the Middle East; fifth, the provision of forces for 
Western Europe; and sixth, the build-up for an ultimate offensive.  Reliance on allies had led 
to a major scaling back in the aspirations of the Royal Navy.  Admiralty proposals assumed 
that allies would provide half of the forces required in the North Atlantic and the 
Mediterranean, and all of the forces for the South Atlantic, the Pacific and the Western Indian 
Ocean; Commonwealth countries would take on South East Asia and the Eastern Indian 
Ocean.  This represented a massive reduction in the global presence of the Royal Navy but 
demonstrated a degree of realism about the need to concentrate its efforts at home.  The three 
pillars of strategy remained defending the UK, sea communications and the Middle East; the 
land commitment would be two divisions each to the Middle East and Western Europe.43 
The new continental commitment remained the subject of much debate.  Late in 1949 
Montgomery’s successor as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal Sir William 
Slim suggested that holding Western Europe should be elevated over defending the Middle 
East.  The other service chiefs remained sceptical.  Tedder believed it would be disastrous for 
Britain to add major land forces in Europe to its defence commitments, while Vice-Admiral 
Sir George Creasy (standing in for Fraser, the First Sea Lord) argued that the two British 
divisions to be committed could hold the Middle East but would make little difference in 
Europe.  Nevertheless, the Committee decided to produce a new study of defence policy.44  
This became ‘Defence Policy and Global Strategy’, the British equivalent of the American 
NSC-68 paper that fundamentally recast US strategy for the cold war.45 
As with many of the key postwar defence reviews, the 1950 Global Strategy paper 
drew on strands that had been perceptible beforehand, yet still marked an important change of 
emphasis.  Its top priority was winning the cold war, including economic recovery, and 
deterrence of rather than planning for major war.  A strategic air campaign using nuclear 
weapons remained ‘the only practical military means of penetrating into Russian territory and 
bringing the war to a successful conclusion at an early date’.  However, nuclear weapons 
would not necessarily provide a quick victory, so conventional forces were still needed.  
Defence of the UK also required that a Soviet advance be stopped as far east as possible.  
Britain should therefore send land forces to Europe (though its land and air defence must be 
mainly the responsibility of the Continental powers) and make a small contribution to the 
strategic air offensive.  The Middle East must be held.  The defence of sea communications 
was also vital, with Russia expected to seek to isolate Europe from overseas reinforcement 
and supply.  The paper therefore listed the most vital interests as securing the base (which 
                                                 
42 See for example, DO(49)20th, 15 November 1949, CAB131/8. 
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involved air defence of the UK and defence of sea communications in Atlantic waters, but 
with the addition of defending the front in Europe), a contribution to allied striking power, 
and minimum conventional forces to hold the base in Egypt and British positions in the cold 
war.  It acknowledged that Britain could not do everything and set the top priorities as 
measures to win the cold war (which included occupation forces in Europe and the conflict in 
Malaya) and preparations for hot war (including air defence, protection of sea 
communications in the North Atlantic and home waters, and commitments to the defence of 
Western Europe).  The second category of priorities – still to be pursued though not to the 
extent that they jeopardise the higher priorities – included a contribution to holding the base 
in Egypt and to controlling sea communications in the Mediterranean.46 
The report represented a clear and compelling account of the political and military 
situation facing the allies but a grave weakness lay in specifying so many ‘essential’ 
commitments, including the air offensive, the holding of both Western Europe and the 
Middle East, the defence of North Atlantic, Home and Mediterranean sea communications, 
and cold war forces.  Global Strategy purported to set priorities but there were so many that it 
provided little indication regarding precisely what could be cut.  While this outcome could be 
dismissed as strategy making by compromise, the alternative was to impose a solution against 
the judgement of one or more of the services and risk neglecting a key area, based on 
assumptions that might prove to be flawed.  The most important conclusions were that Britain 
had now committed to sending land and air forces to Western Europe (which was placed 
above the Middle East in importance) and to fighting the cold war globally.  When the report 
was written, the latter took the form largely of political measures and deterrent forces, but a 
conflict soon erupted which would increase both the military component of British cold war 
strategy and the scale of the forces committed in Europe. 
The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 shook the comfortable assumptions that 
war was unlikely before 1957 and would be preceded by ample warning time.  It appeared to 
demonstrate that, regardless of the supposed deterrent effect of American strategic air power, 
the Communist bloc was prepared to resort to direct military attack in addition to intimidation 
and subversion.  General war suddenly seemed far more likely than hitherto and the Defence 
Committee reluctantly noted that although plans assumed 18 months warning of war, Korea 
suggested that there could be little or no notice: ‘In these circumstances, the peace-time 
forces maintained by the United Kingdom were hardly more than bluff.’  Accordingly, in 
September 1950, Attlee announced significantly increased expenditure and in December, 
Hugh Gaitskell, the Chancellor, agreed to a further increase in the defence budget of more 
than a third.47  While Korea changed the perceived likelihood of hostilities, the type of war 
envisaged and the capabilities upon which rearmament concentrated were much the same as 
before.  It might seem paradoxical that preparations for a total war centring on Europe were 
accelerated by a distant regional conflict which was limited politically, geographically and in 
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the weapons used.  In fact, the limited nature of the Korean War was seen as exceptional and 
the focus of planning continued to be a general war with the USSR which would involve 
nuclear weapons.  Rearmament therefore concentrated on global war tasks. 
New government, new review 
In October 1951, a general election returned the Conservative Party to power, with Winston 
Churchill as Prime Minister once again.  ‘Rab’ Butler, the new Chancellor, was alarmed by 
the effect of the defence programme on Britain’s balance of payment as well as its high cost, 
which was rising with inflation.48  He therefore sought reductions in defence expenditure, 
reducing in scale the planned rearmament and stretching it over a longer period.  The 
emphasis shifted from readiness to meet an immediate crisis to facing ‘the long haul’.  In 
March 1952, the Chiefs of Staff were asked to revise defence plans in the light of 
technological developments and changes in the international situation since the 1950 paper, 
and because economic difficulties were calling the rearmament programme into question.49  
Thus began the latest stage in the adaptation of British defence policy to the nuclear age. 
The revised ‘Defence Policy and Global Strategy’ paper was approved in June 1952.50  
The key development was a stronger emphasis on deterring rather than waging total war.  US 
nuclear power would either deter the USSR or, failing that, provide a war-winning capability.  
The Soviet Union would therefore use other means, so NATO faced a prolonged cold war, 
yet, if this were waged ‘in a patient, level-headed and determined manner’, hot war could be 
avoided.  The main nuclear deterrent should be backed by the ‘complementary deterrent’ of 
land and air forces, armed with tactical nuclear weapons, to delay a Russian advance until the 
strategic offensive took effect, to counter infiltration, and for the cold war.  UK priorities 
should be, first, to protect its interests in the cold war; second, to make a contribution to the 
deterrent (to confer influence with the US and to target objectives of particular importance to 
Britain, such as submarine and air bases); and third, to prepare for war in case deterrence 
should fail – all without ruining the economy.51  Whereas previous plans had envisaged a war 
in which conventional forces would play a central role – as confirmed by post-Korean War 
rearmament – Global Strategy sought to reduce the costs of defence by increasing the 
emphasis on nuclear weapons. 
The principal novelty in this paper relating to the role of sea power was its description 
of the expected course of a future war.  It would begin with a phase ‘of unparalleled intensity’ 
in which Britain would be subject to attack with atomic weapons as well as a determined 
offensive against her sea communications.  What would follow was uncertain (although 
enemy activity would be less reduced at sea than ashore) so plans for war should focus on 
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this opening phase, not least because preparation for a long war was unaffordable.  The report 
accepted that sea lanes must be kept open or ‘the United Kingdom will soon cease to fight 
and will starve’.  Protection of ‘the North Atlantic and the United Kingdom’s home waters, 
through which run what are literally the country’s lifelines’ was a high priority commitment 
even during the opening phase, ‘but provision for it must be conditioned by the probable 
nature and duration of a future war.’52 
So, the paper gave a nod in the direction of the need to defend sea communications 
but could hardly be described as strongly supportive.  The prospect of fighting on at sea after 
the opening, nuclear phase of a war was included in the paper at the insistence of the First 
Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Rhoderick McGrigor.53  The general perception of the 
concept is suggested by the label attacked to it of ‘broken-backed’ warfare.  However, the 
Admiralty was by no means alone in doubting that a future war would necessarily be short.  
In discussions with the British Ambassador in Washington, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs 
of Staff General Omar Bradley explained that the US anticipated a long war which would 
probably involve a need for re-invasion and liberation of Europe.  The Americans generally 
expected that the war would be long because the air campaign would not prevent the USSR 
overrunning Europe, although Bradley added: ‘There were a few enthusiasts in the US Air 
Force who thought they could win a quick and easy victory.  He did not agree.’54 
Churchill at times seemed to share the view that the threat to sea communications was 
serious, telling the House of Commons that three threats could affect Britain’s survival, 
which in order were mines, submarines ‘and the threat from the air, ever-growing in its shore-
based power’.55  He was not always consistent, however, at other times playing down the 
threat at sea.56  Thus, at a Chiefs of Staff meeting in June 1952, he approved the sections of 
the ‘Global Strategy’ draft dealing with the expected length and nature of a future war, and 
argued that if the strategic air campaign paid sufficient attention to Russian submarine and 
minelayer bases, ‘there was little prospect of the war at sea being very prolonged, since the 
Russians would have expended their means of replenishment and their bases would be 
destroyed.’57  Yet in October 1953, he objected to an Admiralty proposal to scrap the 
remaining five battleships on the grounds that, ‘In the “broken-backed” warfare which was 
likely to succeed the first atomic phase of a future war, these ships would probably be able to 
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fulfil a valuable role.’58  The Air Ministry provided increasingly strident arguments that the 
Navy should be the target for major reductions in expenditure, especially under Marshal of 
the RAF Sir John Slessor, who became Chief of the Air Staff in January 1950.59  As early as 
his second day in office, he had written an internal memorandum setting out his firm 
intention to launch a long-planned assault on naval aviation.60  He continued this effort 
throughout his time at the top, in August 1952 formally proposing heavy cuts to it.61 
In Cabinet, Earl Alexander (Minister of Defence)62 summarised the position as 
involving no change in the size of the Army, some reduction in the Navy’s Active Fleet, and 
expanding the RAF for air defence and as a contribution to allied deterrent forces.63  
However, once again Butler demanded further economies.  A series of committees failed to 
unearth cuts of the scale sought, so a further re-think was necessary, and on 7 November 
1952 the government decided on ‘a radical review of the pattern of our defence effort’.64  If 
modern technology was to be accommodated within a decreasing budget then either 
commitments would have to be cut dramatically (from which politicians then as now 
recoiled) or a major alteration in assumptions was needed.  As the extended ‘radical review’ 
process unfolded, the two-phase war concept established by the 1952 Global Strategy paper, 
over-simplified and shorn of most of the qualifications included in the document, was turned 
against the Navy, which was far and away the principal target for attack.65 
The ‘Radical Review’ 
The first committee of the review comprised officials from the key ministries and the Chiefs 
of Staff, chaired by the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Norman Brook.66  It reaffirmed the conclusions 
of the 1952 Global Strategy paper, including the need to defend sea communications and the 
impossibility of planning only for a short war.  No significant savings could be made without 
‘major changes in defence policy’, it noted, which required decisions by ministers rather than 
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officials.67  The review’s subsequent committees were composed of ministers, usually not 
involving the Chiefs of Staff but calling on them for advice as required. 
 The first of these higher-level bodies was the ‘Ministerial Committee on Defence 
Policy’,68 which in addition to Churchill, Butler, Alexander and the three service ministers 
included the two individuals who would lead the assault on the Navy during the radical 
review – both of whom were close to Churchill and increasingly influenced him as his health 
deteriorated.69  Lord Swinton was Commonwealth Secretary but had been the pre-war 
Secretary of State for Air who unsuccessfully resisted the return to the Navy of the Fleet Air 
Arm.70  Duncan Sandys, Churchill’s son-in-law, sat on the committee as Minister of Supply 
(overseeing the production of aircraft and other equipment and hence playing a role in 
defence policy).71  The Admiralty perceived Sandys as deeply hostile, with one of his 
memoranda being described as ‘virulent’ and a ‘diatribe against the Navy.’72 
Whereas both the Global Strategy paper and the Brook committee had rejected the 
option of concentrating on the initial, nuclear phase of a global war, Sandys set the 
foundations for what would follow by insisting that this opening period would be decisive.  
Any preparations for the ‘broken-backed warfare’ that would follow were therefore low 
priority and in effect unnecessary.  He placed operations at sea firmly in this category and 
therefore argued for deep cuts in the Navy.73  The rest of the committee acquiesced with this 
dramatically new approach to defence priorities.  Alexander instructed the Chiefs that, 
‘Forces which would not have a decisive effect upon our survival through the opening phase 
but would be needed in an ensuing period of “broken-backed” warfare’ – in which he 
explicitly included those for the defence of sea communications – should be the lowest 
priority.  They should be funded only after the needs of the higher priorities (forces for cold 
war commitments and for the opening period of war) had been fully met.  The broad strategic 
vision that informed these arguments was illuminated by the instruction, simply asserted 
without any supporting evidence or analysis, ‘It should be assumed that, in view of the 
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increasing range of shore-based aircraft, and the development of guided missiles, carrier-
borne aircraft will in future play a less important strategic role.’74 
 The Chiefs of Staff united to oppose this drive, criticising both the assumptions and 
the deductions drawn from them.  They rejected the attempt to categorize military capabilities 
in this way, dismissed the assertion that survival would depend only on the opening period of 
a war (or that it was possible to firmly predict how a future war would unfold), and noted that 
the minister had quite contradicted the endorsed Global Strategy paper.75  McGrigor insisted 
that protecting sea communications would be vital both in the initial stages of war (thus 
disagreeing with the category in which the task was placed) and also after the opening period 
(thus disputing the idea that the third category could be disregarded).76  It was reasonable to 
suggest that the USSR foresaw a role for naval forces in a nuclear war; as Phillip Newell, 
Head of Military Branch in the Admiralty, wrote, the fact that it was still building cruisers 
showed that it believed it would have ‘surface ships on the loose during the atomic phase’.77 
Sandys and his fellow travellers sought to focus strategy narrowly in terms of the 
scenario planned for (the initial six-week ‘survival’ period of a war) and the composition of 
the deterrent (nuclear-armed bombers alone, not conventional forces).  The Admiralty 
questioned the predicted nature of a future war on which the anti-Navy case rested.  The 
Director of Naval Intelligence suggested that cities might not be subject to nuclear attack 
early in a war, which precluded the possibility of Russia being defeated in six weeks.  Hence 
it was reasonable to plan for a survival period of six months, which made defending sea 
communications more important.78  McGrigor found an apt quotation: ‘It will be a violent 
storm but very short.  I count on a war of three months, and I have organised all my policy on 
that assumption’.  He continued, ‘This was not said by the present Minister of Defence or 
Supply, but by the German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg in August 1914 and quoted in 
Prince Bulow’s memoirs.  I feel it is too good to waste.’79  They had allies in their scepticism 
about the politically convenient assumptions of their critics.  Field Marshal Sir John Harding, 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, noted that the growing Soviet nuclear capability 
undermined the policy of massive retaliation, while Sir Frederick Brundrett (who in 1954 
became chief scientific adviser to the Minister of Defence and chairman of the defence 
research policy committee)80 predicted that as the West lost its nuclear advantage over the 
USSR, the weight placed on the secondary, conventional deterrent would have to increase.81  
The First Sea Lord with the support of the other Chiefs pointed out that the Ministerial Sub-
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Committee was contradicting the agreed approach of Global Strategy by playing down the 
cold war (to which they had given top priority) and deterrence in favour of the opening period 
of a hot war.  They also objected that the priority attached to the first six weeks of a war ‘had 
been wrongly interpreted to exclude further peacetime preparations outside that period’.82 
Throughout the different stages of the radical review, the principal – and it often 
seemed the only – target for those seeking savings was the Navy in general and, in particular, 
the fleet carriers and their strike capability.  Those attacking naval aviation had a range of 
motives.  In large part the campaign was a re-fighting of old ideological battles that the air 
enthusiasts had lost; this category included Swinton as well as former Chiefs of the Air Staff 
who now chipped in from the House of Lords, such as Lord Trenchard and Lord Tedder.  
This category overlapped with those fighting to expand the current RAF at the expense of the 
Navy, including the Secretary of State throughout this period, Lord De L’Isle83 and many 
serving officers in the Air Staff.  However, its Chief, Marshal of the RAF Sir William 
Dickson – who had served at sea during the First World War with the Royal Naval Air 
Service – was notably less aggressive than his predecessor in the post.84  Others were swayed 
by the simplistic argument that land-based air power was eclipsing sea power in general and 
naval aviation in particular; these included the fading star that was Churchill, still seduced by 
the mirage of strategic bombing,85 as well as Sandys (who often proved susceptible to 
extravagant claims made on behalf of new technology).86  The Chancellor and the Treasury 
were happy, as always, to exploit the anti-Navy campaign in order to achieve savings, though 
they would have been equally content to see these come from other areas of the defence 
programme. 
A detailed account of the arguments for and against the fleet carriers and the strike 
capability of the Fleet Air Arm is beyond the scope of this paper.87  The key argument offered 
against this core capability was that, while there might be a case for light fleet carriers for 
limited defence of shipping against air attack and submarines, Britain could not afford the 
more expensive fleet carriers and their strike capability – for which the US could be relied 
upon.  Its roles should be left to the US or to increasingly capable shore-based aircraft, which 
could fulfil the roles of naval aviation more effectively and more economically.  Some critics 
accepted that a strike component was needed against surface warships (others argued that 
even this role should be left to land-based aircraft or US carriers) but the use of carrier 
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aircraft against shore targets came in for particular criticism, as duplicating the jealously 
protected role of the RAF bomber force.88  In defence of the fleet carriers, the Admiralty 
insisted that the ability to protect sea communications was a core part of the deterrent to war.  
Fleet carriers provided cover against heavy air or surface attack and were therefore essential 
to the operation of other, lighter naval forces.  They also offered the ability to hit targets 
outside the range of land-based aircraft.  Their tasks should no more be abandoned and 
entirely left to the US than should those of the bomber force; doing so would have the same 
detrimental effect on Britain’s voice in allied strategy.  Britain was the only European state 
that could offer fleet carriers, whereas many deployed land-based aircraft; besides, according 
to NATO plans there would be no US fleet carriers in European waters for at least the first 
two weeks of the war.  Moreover, once the Fleet Air Arm was equipped with nuclear 
weapons, it could make a useful contribution to the primary deterrent – which would be 
particularly valuable in the light of the increasing vulnerability of the V-bombers.  The carrier 
case tended to follow that of its critics in focussing primarily on total war, but there were 
some references to the utility of carriers in the cold war, notably their ability to reach the area 
of a crisis before land-based aircraft could be deployed, and their economy in view of the fact 
that they avoided the need to build expensive air bases.89 
This first stage of the radical review saw a reprieve for the Admiralty when the key 
February 1954 meeting of the ministerial committee decided to retain the fleet carriers, while 
requesting further studies.90  The threat was seen off for now, if not defeated. 
The Admiralty also seemed to be gaining some traction with its wider case about the 
nature of a future war.  While the 1954 Defence White Paper stated that a global war would 
see both sides use nuclear weapons in a short and immensely destructive opening phase, it 
went on: ‘If no decisive result were reached in this opening phase, hostilities would decline in 
intensity, though perhaps less so at sea than elsewhere, and a period of “broken-backed” 
warfare would follow, during which the opposing sides would seek to recover their strength, 
carrying on the struggle in the meantime as best they might.’91  During the parliamentary 
debate on the White Paper, Nigel Birch (Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence) 
stressed that a ‘firm defensive shield in Europe’ was almost as important a part of the 
deterrent as the threat of nuclear weapons.  This included a requirement for conventional 
weapons at sea, to maintain the flow of supplies to Britain and to the continent.  The Navy 
was concentrating on countering mines and submarines, yet: ‘The carrier also has a vital role 
to play.  At present, there is no other way of dealing with enemy bombers over the open sea 
or, perhaps more important, of dealing with enemy reconnaissance aircraft shadowing our 
convoys.’  Besides, instead of hot war there might be a continuation of cold war, as in Korea, 
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Malaya and Indochina: ‘To carry on a cold war there must be troops armed with conventional 
weapons.  What good are atomic weapons in Malaya?’92 
The 1954 strategy paper 
British strategy was still in the early stages of coming to terms with the nuclear age.  Some 
air power advocates tended to depict a future war as a rerun of the Second World War but 
with a more effective Anglo-American strategic bombing offensive.  The harsh reality began 
to dawn.  A January 1954 report on the initial stages of a total war estimated that Britain 
would suffer two million casualties, eight million people would be made homeless, London 
would not be practicable as a city to live in or as a seat of government ‘for an indefinite 
period’ and the country would lose 75% of its rail network, 60% of its gas supplies and 40% 
of its electricity generation.  It predicted, with classic British understatement, that civilian 
morale would be ‘poor’.93  Yet this report took account only of fission weapons and not the 
hydrogen bomb which would be far more destructive.  As the implications of the H-bomb 
sank in, British policy faced another rethink.94  In April 1954, another ministerial body was 
established, referred to as the ‘Salisbury Committee’ after its chairman.  Its remit was to take 
account of the new factor of thermonuclear weapons but also to reduce defence spending by 
about ten per cent.95  While such a saving would require a major change in defence policy, 
such a shift was now plausible: the Joint Intelligence Committee judged that the H-bomb 
made global war unlikely, raising the prospect of economies in war stocks and reserves.96  
Once again, the Chiefs were tasked to revise British strategy. 
The principal conclusion of ‘United Kingdom Defence Policy’ was that the H-bomb 
made general war far less likely than previous reports had believed.  If there should be a war, 
it would involve nuclear weapons from the outset (as well as attacks by Soviet conventional 
forces) and would devastate the UK.  However, NATO military strength meant that the USSR 
was unlikely to provoke a war for the next few years, so some risks could prudently be taken 
with war preparations.  The cold war, on the other hand, was likely to last a long time.  
Britain’s priority should therefore be preventing global war, which required the ‘main 
deterrent’ of nuclear weapons with conventional forces as ‘an essential complement’.  Yet the 
prevention of general war also required that Britain maintain its influence as a world power 
and meet its cold war commitments, in part to prevent a local war that could escalate.  Forces 
for influence and for the cold war should therefore be prioritised above those for fighting a 
general war.  Large cuts in conventional forces could harm NATO but capabilities that would 
be unavailable immediately on the outbreak of global war could be safely reduced.  For the 
Navy, ‘Preparations for the control of sea communications are not only reduced in priority 
but may well be altered in form.’  However, the USSR would launch concerted attacks on 
Western sea communications from the outset of the war, so there was still a need to defend 
shipping and to destroy the enemy’s fleet, merchant shipping and bases – and although the 
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nuclear exchange would probably decide the outcome of the war, fighting would continue 
thereafter albeit on a smaller scale.  There could be some reduction in minesweepers and 
perhaps escorts, due to the reduced requirement for imports.  In addition to these wartime 
tasks the main role of the Navy in peacetime would be to support Britain’s worldwide 
interests, which required ‘a balanced fleet including ships of all types except battleships’.97 
The 1954 strategy paper therefore represented a significant shift in British policy – the 
most noteworthy conceptual change in the period considered by this paper.  In addition to 
deterring war (for which conventional forces including navies were essential), the principal 
concerns of strategy and defence policy were given as peacetime responsibilities and the cold 
war, rather than preparations to fight a major war.  For these vital peacetime and limited war 
roles, sea power offered particular advantages in terms of projecting power and influence 
around the world.  The strategy paper therefore appeared to provide the Navy with the firmest 
foundation it had enjoyed since the end of the war.  However, other agendas meant that some 
in government were reluctant to fully embrace the implications of this change of course in 
British strategy. 
The report of the Salisbury committee listed cuts volunteered by the three services.98  
The Navy proposed to scrap large numbers of ships in the lower categories of the reserve to 
focus on those that would be ready soon after mobilisation.  Some planned conversions were 
cancelled and the new construction programme was extended over a longer period, as well as 
being confined to ships needed in war but which would also have the highest value in peace 
and the cold war (such as the Tiger-class cruisers and the Hermes-class light fleet carriers).  
The resulting defence programme was still considerably more expensive than the Chancellor 
was prepared to concede, so yet another committee was established to identify further 
savings.  The composition of the ‘Cabinet Committee on Defence Review’ raises a suspicion 
that it was designed, principally by Brook, to reach a pre-determined outcome.99  While 
Churchill attended some meetings, its core membership was just three men – Swinton (who 
had already shown his hand in the earlier stages of the radical review) as chair, Sandys (the 
most implacable opponent of the Navy) and the often ineffectual Lord Alexander, the 
Minister of Defence.100  The latter had changed his earlier views and now supported the 
Navy’s case on the fleet carriers and the strike component of the Fleet Air Arm.101  He was 
about to be absent for a fortnight on a visit to the US but Brook via the Prime Minister 
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suggested that the other two members of the committee should start work anyway.  Working 
at a pace unusual in Whitehall, they held a series of meetings, completed their analysis and 
produced a draft report before Alexander returned to join them.102 
The Swinton Committee was the most controversial of the this period, the most 
bitterly fought and the most precisely targeted at sea power in general and naval aviation in 
particular.  Whereas the Chiefs of Staff strategy paper, which was endorsed by the Cabinet, 
had minimised the importance of the initial period of a global war, this committee decided 
that there should be an even closer concentration on it.  Moreover, they argued that exactly 
the same forces were needed to wage the cold war as to fight a hot one.103  Their investigation 
spent little time on the Army programme and waved through that of the RAF; they made no 
recommendations for substantive change to either.  They focused almost exclusively on the 
Navy, and in particular on the fleet carriers and the strike capability of the Fleet Air Arm.  
Their detailed arguments were much the same as those from earlier in the review, particularly 
the claim that land-based aircraft could perform the roles of fleet carriers more effectively 
and more economically.  British carriers should be withdrawn from NATO Striking Fleet, the 
main role of which was (they asserted, incorrectly) to attack targets ashore in support of the 
land battle, and should limit themselves to defending sea communications. 
What the Navy referred to as the ‘Swinton-Sandys inquisition’104 did not confine itself 
to criticising the case for the fleet carriers; it also proffered some bold proclamations about 
sea power itself: ‘In the new strategic conditions, the relative importance of sea power in our 
defence is evidently diminishing and there is no sign that this trend will be arrested. There 
can be no question of having a larger Navy than we need, or can afford; and we must make 
the best use of existing material. It is natural that the Navy should wish to have their share in 
air power which is growing in importance.’105  Worryingly for the Navy, these words 
originated with Churchill and Brook, who also explicitly disagreed with Alexander’s plea to 
‘continue to keep three balanced services’, mainly because the carrier was becoming 
‘obsolescent’ and ‘the days of manned aircraft are numbered’,106 making their continued faith 
in manned aircraft in the RAF rather puzzling. 
The Admiralty fought back furiously, insisting that sea power was every bit as 
important as it had ever been, not least in its ability to provide ‘that essential strategic and 
tactical mobility which cannot be given to land-based aircraft’.  It pointed out that carriers 
were considerably less vulnerable than air bases in fixed and known locations, and argued 
that even if the fleet carriers were removed from NATO Striking Fleet (at high cost to British 
influence in the alliance), they would still need the same aircraft to counter enemy aircraft, 
submarines and surface warships.  Moreover, carriers had enormous value both as part of the 
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deterrent to general war and in the cold war.107  The evidence suggested that the USSR 
anticipated a major struggle over sea communications in a future war, with Naval Intelligence 
reporting that their output of ocean-going submarines had increased from 54 in 1953 to 74 in 
1954.108  Alexander now firmly supported the Navy, repeating the criticism that the Swinton 
committee wilfully misrepresented the principal role of Striking Fleet, which was to provide 
cover for lighter forces protecting sea communications and attack at source of threats to it.109  
Swinton and Sandys simply ignored the input of the third member of their committee, despite 
his position; their final report was unchanged from the draft to which Alexander had objected 
so strenuously, to the extent of threatening to resign.110 
The stakes were high; Newell commented that the decision over the Swinton report 
could be ‘as grave as any that has faced the Navy in history’, and concluded: ‘Minesweepers 
apart, we have gone as far as we can without becoming a French Navy.’111  Still, the Swinton-
Sandys line was flirting with collapse, ignoring as it did the recent shift from focusing on 
fighting the first six weeks of a hot war, to deterring that war and waging the cold war around 
the world.  Their conception of what constituted the deterrent to war was the narrowest 
possible, and also went against the military advice that the Chiefs of Staff presented in a 
strong common front – as well as going against what the Soviet Union evidently believed 
would be important in a future war.  Their arguments simply failed to engage with the evident 
utility of naval forces, especially carriers, in limited war and crisis. The offensive by Swinton 
and Sandys therefore ran out of momentum; with the resolute opposition of the Admiralty 
and the Minister of Defence, and without the strong backing of the Chief of the Air Staff, it 
faced an uphill battle.  This was compounded by the absence of Sandys from a key meeting 
of the committee – it was his turn to be abroad – and while Swinton stuck to his guns, 
Churchill no longer had his former dominant presence.  The meeting reached a conclusion 
that appeared relatively anodyne, that the Minister of Defence and the Admiralty should 
continue to review naval aviation, but the sting had been drawn from the attack on the Royal 
Navy.112  By the next meeting of the committee in October 1954, a government reshuffle had 
seen Sandys depart the Ministry of Supply for the Ministry of Housing, ending his central 
role in defence matters for the time being, at least.  Alexander, who had become a staunch 
supporter of the Admiralty on these matters, was replaced as Minister of Defence by Harold 
Macmillan – who took office, auspiciously, on Trafalgar Day.113   
He too supported the Admiralty position against the lone voice of Swinton, arguing 
that the latter’s proposals would save far less than he had claimed while the price in lost 
capability would be high.  The Chief of the Air Staff backed the Navy and the Treasury was 
                                                 
107 The Admiralty’s response to the Swinton committee is in a series of papers in ADM205/98. 
108 Head of M. to First Sea Lord, ‘C(54)250 – The Report on Defence Policy to be taken at tomorrow’s Cabinet’, 
26 July 1954, also DNI to First Sea Lord, 26 July 1954, both ADM205/97.  The figure for Soviet production in 
1954 alone was greater than the entire German submarine force on the outbreak of the Second World War. 
109 Alexander to Churchill, 25 August 1954, PREM11/617. 
110 Alexander to Churchill, 13 August 1954, PREM11/706.  Apparently Alexander ‘was vexed at Duncan’s 
intervention’; Churchill to Swinton, 19 August 1954, PREM11/617 
111 Head of M. to First Sea Lord, 13 September 1954, ADM205/98. 
112 DR(54)9th, 28 September 1954, considering DR(54)12, ‘Revised draft report’, 24 September 1954, both 
CAB134/811. 
113 Thorpe, D.R., Supermac: The Life of Harold Macmillan (London: Chatto and Windus, 2010), p.291. 
23 
 
mollified with other savings; the matter passed to the Cabinet.114  The paper submitted by 
Churchill retained the recommendation to slash naval aviation as well as the assertion that sea 
power was declining in strategic importance; the accompanying Admiralty paper contained 
an implicit threat that the Board of Admiralty would resign if it were approved.115  They did 
not need to take this step.  Macmillan had read a paper by Brundrett, arguing that the Swinton 
committee had ignored the Chiefs’ advice that the deterrent and limited war should take 
priority over preparations for hot war.  Brundrett saw the carriers and naval aviation as being 
‘fully justified on the basis of the warm war need’, which would only increase with the 
increasing emphasis on deterring global war.116  This argument seems to have struck a chord 
with Macmillan,117 whose strong defence of the fleet carriers and their strike capability 
included their hot war roles (notably the need to attack Soviet surface warships as well as the 
influence they conferred over the use of NATO Striking Fleet) but also set great store by the 
value of carrier air power in local wars that were likely to become more common in light of 
the approaching nuclear standoff.118  The Cabinet accepted the arguments of the Admiralty 
(conveyed by McGrigor in a highly effective presentation)119 and the Minister of Defence and 
left the final decision to the latter.120  His final paper backed the role of naval aviation 
including a strike component in hot war but also in warm war and recommended that the 
carriers retain their current complement and role.121  Macmillan went on to back the 
Admiralty in the remaining questions from the earlier assault, not least continuing the 
programme for the new naval strike aircraft.122 
The Navy had come through the trials of the early 1950s with colours flying.  The 
controversy over the nature of future war, and the role of conventional forces within it, was 
not yet definitively resolved and would recur.  Yet at least Admiralty had seen off its 
attackers and achieved a general acceptance that there was a role for sea power and the Royal 
Navy, including naval aviation, in a future war.  The February 1955 Defence White Paper 
emphasised the importance of thermonuclear weapons (as well as announcing the decision to 
acquire them)123 and stressed the centrality of nuclear deterrence.  Yet it also underlined the 
importance of conventional forces, including the Navy; nuclear weapons ‘do not radically 
alter the role of any of the three fighting Services’ and each would contribute to the deterrent, 
the cold war and fighting a major war, in which both land and naval forces would be needed, 
although their weapons, organisation, tactics and training would be ‘profoundly affected’.  In 
                                                 
114 DR(54)10th, 26 October 1954, discussing DR(54)14, 13 October 1954, Minister of Defence, ‘Naval 
Expenditure’, both CAB134/811. 
115 C(54)329, Prime Minister, ‘Defence Policy’, 3 November 1954; C(54)332, First Lord, ‘Defence Policy: Fleet 
Air Arm’, 4 November 1954, both CAB129/71.  Confirmation of the resignation threat is in Head of M. Branch 
to First Sea Lord, 13 September 1954, ADM205/98. 
116 Brundrett to Minister of Defence, 18 November 1954, DEFE13/66. 
117 He set considerable store by Brundrett’s advice, describing him in his memoirs as his ‘chief support’ as 
Minister of Defence; Macmillan, H., Tides of Fortune 1945-55 (London: Macmillan, 1969), p.562. 
118 MISC/M(54)123rd, 6 December 1954, DEFE13/66. 
119 Grove, ‘Admiral Sir Rhoderick McGrigor’, pp. 258-59. 
120 CC(54)73rd Conclusions, 5 November 1954, CAB128/27. 
121 D(55)1, Minister of Defence, ‘Defence Policy: Heavy Aircraft Carriers’, 7 January 1955, approved by the 
Defence Committee at D(55)1st, 13 January 1955; both CAB131/15. 
122 D(55)3rd, 15 March 1955, CAB131/15. 
123 Hennessy, P., Cabinet (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp.135-41. 
24 
 
terms of the Navy specifically, while it mentioned the utility of naval forces in limited war, it 
also noted the growth of the Soviet Navy, the importance of defending sea communications 
‘without which we cannot for long survive’, and the need to make some provision for 
operations after the initial phase of a war.124 
A few weeks later, in April 1955, there was a change at the top table as Churchill 
finally retired, handing over as Prime Minister to Anthony Eden.  McGrigor was succeeded 
as First Sea Lord by Earl Mountbatten of Burma.  Another defence review would swiftly 
follow, driven as always by the need to fit ambitious policy goals into a squeezed budget.  
But while the role of the Navy would be an important element of the unfolding debate, the 
threat it faced was never as fundamental as it had been in the previous years – despite the 
appointment in January 1957 of Duncan Sandys as Minister of Defence. 
Conclusion 
The ten years following the end of the Second World War saw enormous challenges for 
British policy and strategy, which had to come to terms with the developing cold war as well 
as the impact of nuclear weapons.  One of the central features of this process was an attack of 
unprecedented severity on the Royal Navy’s core capability, naval aviation, and even more 
broadly on the very place of sea power in British strategy.  It is truly remarkable that a state 
with the geography, history, and political and economic interests of Britain should lapse into 
such existential doubt about its need for sea power.  While debates over the precise 
capabilities required of the Royal Navy would become a recurrent theme of post-1945 British 
defence policy, the attack was never again as acute as it was in the early 1950s. 
The principal source of this onslaught was the Air Ministry, where many individuals 
were still fighting old battles based on theories about strategic air power that had been 
thoroughly discredited during the war but which nonetheless refused to lay down and die.  
They fought alongside some powerful ministerial critics such as Duncan Sandys and, at 
times, Churchill and initially Lord Alexander, the Minister of Defence.  This sceptical core 
found allies of convenience among ministers and officials, mainly from the Treasury but also 
including Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, who were simply content to attack a convenient 
target that apparently offered significant savings.  The case of the critics was based around a 
narrowly framed view of a future war as short and inevitably nuclear from the outset, together 
with a denial that there was any requirement to defend sea communications in such a war.  
This claim was extended to deny that a capability to defend them was part of the deterrent to 
war.  The Navy’s tormentors further reflected their ideological hinterland by asserting the 
superiority of land-based air power over navies and naval aviation in particular.   
The Admiralty marshalled an effective case which allowed it to build on the sympathy 
of other key departments such as the Foreign Office, to convert Lord Alexander and to build 
on common interests with Dickson as Chief of the Air Staff.  They convinced enough 
ministers that there was a need to defend sea communications in global war, all the more if it 
became prolonged or if nuclear weapons were not used at the start.  Forces capable of 
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defending them were a vital part of the deterrent to war both directly and in terms of 
solidifying the Western alliance on which British strategy increasingly depended.  The 
Admiralty further succeeded in making the case that the defence of sea communications 
required a surface navy including fleet carriers with advanced fighters and strike aircraft.  As 
waging global war lost its central place as the main focus of strategy, fighting the cold war 
and maintaining Britain’s position as a world power moved up the policy agenda.  Here, 
naval power continued to offer distinct advantages to policy-makers. 
In these debates, the ‘dog that did not bark’ (though at times it did growl noticeably) 
was the role of Navy in general and of carriers in particular in limited war, as had been 
demonstrated in Korea.  It is perhaps surprising that this was not more of a focus given the 
growing prominence of this theme in the reviews of this period.  This role, however, would 
soon become increasingly central for the Royal Navy as doubts grew over its place in total 
war, even becoming its main focus during the 1957 defence review.  During the first decade 
after the end of the Second World War, however, relatively little attention was devoted to 
military intervention outside Europe.  The focus was very much on general war. 
The Admiralty faced a formidable array of critics who sought to bring down the Navy 
either as an end in itself or as a means to the end of reducing the defence budget.  That these 
repeated and high-stakes attacks were, to a large degree, successfully fought off was no mean 
achievement.  It rested largely on the fact that the importance of sea power in British strategy 
remained difficult to ignore even for those inclined to try their hardest to do so. 
 
